A multi-proxy quantum group signature scheme with threshold shared verification is proposed. An original signer may authorize a proxy group as his proxy agent. Then only the cooperation of all the signers in the proxy group can generate the proxy signature on behalf of the original signer. In the scheme, any t or more of n receivers can verify the message and any t − 1 or fewer receivers cannot verify the validity of the proxy signature.
Introduction
Quantum cryptography is one of the most remarkable applications of quantum mechanics to quantum information. Quantum cryptography exploits the principles of quantum mechanics to enable a provably secure distribution of private information, including quantum key distribution(QKD), [1−5] quantum secure direct communication(QSDC) [6−10] and so on.
With the development of quantum cryptography, quantum signature has been pursued by some groups. [11−15] Gottesman and Chuang [11] applied quantum one-way function to quantum signature. Zeng and Christoph [12] proposed an arbitrated quantum signature scheme in which signature and verification processes were performed with the help of a trusted third party. In some special situations, for example, an original signer cannot make a signature because of some reasons such as the line of duty, illness and so on, and he may authorize a proxy group as his signature proxy agent. Only the cooperation of all members in the proxy group can generate the proxy signature on behalf of the original signer. However, the proposed schemes in Refs. [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] cannot meet such a requirement.
In this paper, we present a multi-proxy quantum group signature scheme with threshold shared verification. An original signer may authorize a proxy group as his proxy agent. Then only the cooperation of all the signers in the proxy group can generate the proxy signature on behalf of the original signer. In the scheme, any t or more of n receivers can verify the message while any t − 1 or fewer receivers cannot verify the validity of the proxy signature. The present scheme follows some ideas of the classical Shamir's threshold signature one. [16] 2. Description of the present scheme
The present scheme includes the following three steps: the distribution phase of individual proxy key; the generation phase of the signature receivers' verification keys; the generation phase of proxy signature; and the threshold shared verification phase.
Distribution phase of individual proxy key
An original signer shares a random key K with the agents using quantum secret sharing such as the ones in Refs. [17, 18] .
where
i are in {0,1}; K j is the jth agent's secret share in quantum secret sharing process and used as the jth agent's proxy key; ⊕ denotes addition modulo 2.
Generation phase of the signature receivers' verification keys
1) The signer makes n shares, S 1 , . . . , S n of K, similar to the classical Shamir's secret sharing scheme [16] over F 2 N as follows, where N = 2m. The signer shares n different 2m-bits, and nonzero-valued x j for j = 1, . . . , n, with the receivers using quantum secret sharing schemes such as the ones in Refs. [17, 18] . Also he chooses (randomly and independently) secret a i for i = 1, . . . , t − 1 in F 2 N . He computes S j = f (x j ) for j = 1, . . . , n over F 2 N , wherex j is a polynomial representation of x j for j = 1, . . . , n, where
f (0) = a 0 =K, whereK is the polynomial representation of K.
2) The signer sendsS j to the receiver R j for j = 1, . . . , n, using the quantum secure direct communication schemes such as the ones in Refs. [9, 10] , whereS j is the binary representation of S j .
3) The receivers compute the preliminary information for the following verification procedure. The preliminary information depends on which subset of receivers is chosen for collaboration. Here, for simplicity in description, we assume the t receivers, R 1 , . . . , R t , collaborate to do that.
For j = 1, . . . , t, R j calculates and secretly stores the following values given by the Lagrange interpolation formula:
be the binary representation of A j in F 2 N , where e
[j] i and f
[j] i are in {0,1}. Although each secret value S j (A j ) is kept in each receiver R j locally, these values satisfy the following equations globally:
over F 2 N . In the binary representation, Eq. (7) can be written as
where ⊕ represents bitwise exclusive-OR. Note that even in the following collaborative procedure,
is kept secret to R j and the original keyK(K) is not recovered.
Generation phase of proxy signature
Suppose that the signer wants to authorize the proxy group to sign a secret message M .
where c i is in {0,1}, i = 1, . . . , m. 1) the first agent U 1 generates a quantum state for the secret message M |φ 1 =|ψ c1⊕a
where for i = 1, . . . , m, a qubit |ψ ci⊕a
is one of the following states:
The value of b [1] i determines the measurement basis. If b [1] i is 0, then c i ⊕ a [1] i is encoded in the Z basis {|0 , |1 }; if b [1] i is 1, then c i ⊕ a [1] i is encoded in the X basis {|+ = (|0 + |1 )/ √ 2, |− = (|0 − |1 )/ √ 2}. Then he sends the quantum state |φ 1 to U 2 . 2) For j = 2, . . . , t, U j receives the |φ
To check a Trojan horse attack, [19−21] he measures the state |φ [j−1] with some photon number splitters (PNSs: 50/50) and some detectors. The measurements will have at least two outcomes if the quantum signal is a multiphoton one. If the quantum signal is a single one, then he applies
is defined as
U (1) =iσ y = |0 1| − |1 0|,
U j then obtains |φ [j] by the unitary transformation
If j < t, U j sends |φ [j] to U j+1 . Otherwise, the proxy signature process has been completed.
Threshold shared verification phase
From Eqs.(3) and (8), we can have (a
(b
Let 
where U
[j]
R 1 then obtains |ψ [1] by the unitary transformation
Then he sends the quantum state |ψ [1] to R 2 .
2) For j = 2, . . . , t, R j receives the state |ψ
from R j−1 . He checks the Trojan horse attack. [19−21] If the quantum signal is a single one, then he applies
If j < t, R j sends |ψ [j] to R j+1 . Otherwise, he proceeds to step 3).
3) R t measures |ψ (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c m ) , then the signature is valid.
Security analysis
Now we will analyse some possible cases: 1) intercept-resend attack; 2) individual cheating attack; 3) (t − 1)-party cheating attack.
1) intercept-resend attack The quantum state sent by R j is multi-qubit tensor product. Each qubit is randomly in one of two conjugated bases. Without the information of b [j] i , the eavesdropper cannot perform the correct unitary operation on each qubit. If he takes an intercept-resend attack, the probability that this attack is not detected is (1/4) m .
2) individual cheating attack Before R j receives the quantum state sent by R j−1 , the eavesdropper Eve can take the Trojan horse attack, [19−21] i.e. he intercepts it and sends another multi-photon quantum state to R j . Eve expects to obtain R j 's secret operation information by measuring the quantum state operated by R j with some photon number splitters (PNSs: 50/50) and some detectors. However his Trojan horse attack will be detected by R 1 in step 3) of the generation phase of group signature. It is similar to the case with the cheater being
3) (t − 1)-party cheating attack Suppose a dishonest member R i aims to find out another member R j 's share and then forge the signature together with other t − 2 members. R i prepares a false signal and sends it to R j . Then from the fake signal operated by R j , R i tries to gain R j 's share.
Without loss of generality, we assume that R j performs one of four kinds of operations on every qubit with equal probability and that every single-qubit operation is independent. So it is sufficient to consider R i 's eavesdropping on one qubit. R i 's false signal can be presented as |θ = |0 (a|0 +b|1 )+|1 (c|0 +d|1 ), where |a| 2 +|b| 2 +|c| 2 + |d| 2 = 1. For simplicity, we regard every probability amplitude as a real number, but the security proof is fitted for a complex number. R i sends the first qubit to R j and keeps the second one. R j encodes his share by performing one of four kinds of operations with equal probability. The state can be expressed by
The mutual information between R i and R j that can be extracted from this state is given by the vonNeumann entropy, I(R i , R j ) ≤ S(Tr e (w)). In order to calculate the von-Neumann entropy, we need to calculate the eigenvalues of Tr e (w), which are the roots of the characteristic polynomial det(Tr e (w) − λI) as follows:
So we have
For λ 1 = λ 2 = 1 2 , I(R i , R j ) reaches a maximal value 1 bit. So R i can eavesdrop 1 bit of 2 bit operation information on one qubit. However, I(R i , R j ) can also reach a maximal value when R i prepares a legal qubit, namely the values of a, b, c and d are chosen to meet the condition ab + cd = 0. Due to the large number of the chosen a, b, c, d meeting the above condition, the values of a, b, c and d are not given here. So R i cannot gain more information by sending a false signal than by sending a legal signal. R i 's eavesdropping will introduce errors and cause the signature to be invalid.
Conclusion
In this paper, we present a multi-proxy quantum group signature scheme with threshold shared verification. An original signer may authorize a proxy group as its proxy agent. Then only the cooperation of all the signers in the proxy group can generate the proxy signature on behalf of the original signer. In the scheme, any t or more of n receivers can verify the message and any t−1 or fewer receivers may not verify the validity of the proxy signature. The present scheme follows some ideas of the classical Shamir threshold signature one. [16] 
